Knowledge base · Instrument
Credit default swaps (CDS)
Credit default swaps (CDS)
Definition
A credit default swap is insurance-like protection on
a borrower’s default: the protection BUYER pays a
running premium (the CDS spread, in basis points per
year); the SELLER pays out if a defined CREDIT EVENT
(bankruptcy, failure to pay, restructuring — per ISDA
definitions) hits the reference entity. For
non-participants, CDS matter as an INFORMATION
instrument: the spread is a continuously-traded,
default-focused price on any large borrower — often
the fastest-moving public gauge of solvency concern
(bank CDS in March 2023 moved before equity in
several names — episode-banking-stress-2023), and
the underlying of the credit indices (CDX, iTraxx)
that price credit-market stress in real time.
How it works / structure
- The contract mechanics: standardized coupons with upfront exchanges, quarterly payments, ISDA-defined credit events adjudicated by Determinations Committees, settlement via AUCTION establishing recovery value (protection pays par minus recovery); post-2008 reforms moved index and much single-name volume to central clearing (the documented counterparty-risk fix).
- Reading the spread (engine-relevant): rough translation — spread ≈ annual default probability × (1 − recovery); at 40% assumed recovery, 300bp implies ~5% annual default probability (crude, regime-adequate); the TERM structure adds information — INVERTED single-name CDS curves (1-year above 5-year) are the documented imminent-distress signature.
- The basis and the indices: CDS vs cash-bond
spread (the basis) reflects funding, liquidity, and
deliverability — its blowouts are stress gauges in
themselves (2008’s negative basis is documented);
CDX IG/HY indices give the tradable market-level
read that
indicator-credit-spreadsuses alongside cash OAS. - The 2008 lessons carried: AIG’s uncollateralized
protection selling (insurance-scale losses without
insurance-scale reserves) and counterparty daisy
chains motivated clearing reform
(
episode-gfc-2008); the “empty creditor” problem (protection holders preferring default) is the documented governance distortion.
When it applies
Solvency monitoring on levered names and banks
(single-name CDS as the fast gauge — where quoted);
credit-regime dashboards (CDX indices intraday);
ext-credit-analysis cross-checks (CDS vs Z-score vs
bond prices triangulate); sovereign-stress reads
(episode-euro-crisis-2012 traded substantially in
sovereign CDS); event anticipation
(event-rating-actions — CDS reprices before
agencies act, documented).
Risk profile & failure modes
- Thin single-name reality: outside indices and large names, single-name CDS liquidity has shrunk materially (documented post-crisis decline) — quoted spreads on smaller names can be stale indications, not tradable prices.
- Definitional edge cases: what counts as a credit event has produced documented controversies (restructuring definitions, “manufactured defaults” — narrowly-engineered triggers); the instrument’s precision is legal, not intuitive.
- Recovery assumption sensitivity: the spread-to-probability translation swings on assumed recovery — distress-regime recoveries vary widely (documented dispersion); treat implied probabilities as ranges.
- Information asymmetry: CDS markets are dealer/institutional — retail reads the prices without the flow context; sudden moves may be one hedger, not a verdict (size and persistence before conclusions).
Evidence & limits
ISDA documentation defines the contract machinery; clearing reform, auction settlement, and the 2008 record are documented regulatory history; the spread-probability arithmetic is standard. Real-time single-name data is paywalled for most retail users — the KB flags data-access limits where the gauge is recommended.
Falsifiable-thesis examples
Illustrations only, not signals:
- “Names whose 1y/5y CDS curve inverts underperform equity-wise over the following quarter (distress-signature check)” — falsified by the cohort return spread.
- “CDS spreads of downgrade candidates widen >30 days before the agency action in most cases (anticipation thesis)” — falsified by the event-time alignment study.
Cross-references
- The analysis frame:
ext-credit-analysis; the market-level gauge:indicator-credit-spreads - The instrument context:
ext-bonds-rates; the rating seam:event-rating-actions - The episode exhibits:
episode-gfc-2008,episode-banking-stress-2023
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